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The 2008-2009 financial crises, while originating in the United States, witnessed a drop in asset prices
and output that was at least as large in the rest of the world as in the United States. A widely held view
is that this was the result of global transmission through leveraged financial institutions. We investigate
this in the context of a simple two-country model. The paper highlights what the various transmission
mechanisms associated with balance sheet losses are, how they operate, what their magnitudes are
and what the role is of different types of borrowing constraints faced by leveraged institutions. For
realistic parameters we find that the model cannot account for the global nature of the crisis, both in





Charlottesville, VA  22904-4182
and NBER
vanwincoop@virginia.edu1 Introduction
In response to the 2008 ￿nancial crisis a debate has reignited about channels of
international transmission. The drop in asset prices was of similar magnitude all
around the world. The decline in real GDP growth was also of similar magnitude
in the rest of the world as in the United States.1 This happened even though
clearly this was a U.S. crisis that started with substantial losses on mortgage
backed securities, which signi￿cantly deteriorated balance sheets of U.S. leveraged
￿nancial institutions. This naturally leads to the question of what can account for
the nearly one-to-one transmission.
A widely held view is that the shock was transmitted across the globe through
leveraged ￿nancial institutions. In this paper we will investigate this view, but
reach a conclusion that is highly skeptical. While surely leveraged ￿nancial insti-
tutions experienced substantial losses associated with asset backed securities and
other assets, in both the United States and Europe, we will argue that the impact
of those losses alone is nowhere near su¢ cient to explain either the magnitude of
the crisis or its global transmission. A more plausible explanation, explored else-
where but discussed near the end of the paper, is a global risk panic that drove
down asset prices and the real economy across the globe.
We will develop a simple two-country model with leveraged ￿nancial institu-
tions in order to address two questions. First, we aim to understand through
what channels of transmission involving leveraged ￿nancial institutions a ￿nancial
shock in the Home country impacts the Foreign country. We will identify ￿ve dif-
ferent transmission channels. Second, we aim to get a sense of the magnitude of
transmission, and the impact on asset prices and lending rates, by calibrating the
model.
We consider the impact of exogenous losses on the balance sheet of leveraged
￿nancial institutions, for example related to mortgage backed securities or mort-
gage loans. Two aspects signi￿cantly limit the global impact of this shock. First,
there is substantial portfolio home bias, including for bank portfolios. Second,
1See for example Perri and Quadrini (2011) for both GDP and stock prices. It shows that
if anything stock prices and GDP fell slightly more in the G6 (the G7 minus the U.S.) than in
the United States. Emerging market growth, while starting from a higher level, dropped about
as much as industrialized country growth (see for example the 2011 World Economic Outlook,
Figure 1.6.).
1using Flow of Funds data we ￿nd that leveraged ￿nancial institutions hold only
20% of ￿nancial assets.
The paper is related to a recent literature that has introduced leveraged ￿-
nancial institutions into open economy macro models. We discuss this literature
in Section 5. Several papers in this literature ￿nd that the impact of ￿nancial
shocks on asset prices and the real economy can be large and that transmission
may be perfect. This is the result of assumptions that either leveraged institutions
are perfectly diversi￿ed across the globe and/or they hold all ￿nancial assets. We
draw the same conclusions when making these assumptions in our model, but we
￿nd both assumptions to be in stark contrast to reality.
The model we use to analyze these issues is much simpler than the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models considered in the literature. While this
simplicity limits the breadth of our results (focusing for example on asset prices
and not on real variables), it allows us to obtain simple analytical results. This
makes it quite transparent what the various transmission channels are, how they
operate, and what their magnitudes are.
Leveraged institutions matter both because of their leverage and because of
borrowing constraints that they face. In order to better understand the role of
these constraints, we ￿rst consider the case where leveraged institutions are not
subject to borrowing constraints. Then we consider the impact of adding either
a constant leverage constraint or a margin constraint. The latter is particularly
relevant for collateralized borrowing. In contrast to a constant leverage constraint,
with a margin constraint borrowing is limited not by the current value of the
institution￿ s assets, but rather by the expected future value of these assets and
risk associated with the return on these assets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
model for each of the three di⁄erent assumptions about the nature of the borrowing
constraints. Section 3 then considers at a theoretical level what determines the
impact on asset prices of marginal defaults in the Home country that lead to losses
on the balance sheets of leveraged institutions. Section 4 calibrates the model in
order to quantify the extent of transmission. Various extensions of the model are
considered as well and the results are related to the 2008 crisis. Section 5 relates
our ￿ndings to the existing literature and Section 6 concludes.
22 The Model
We ￿rst discuss the basic setup that applies under all three assumptions about
borrowing constraints. After that we describe equilibrium under the di⁄erent as-
sumptions about borrowing constraints.
2.1 Basic Setup
The model has two countries, Home and Foreign. There are both leveraged ￿-
nancial institutions and non-leveraged investors in each country. There are two
periods, 1 and 2. However, leveraged institutions inherit assets from a previous
period, which we call period 0, which a⁄ects their net worth at time 1.
We start with a description of the leveraged institutions. They purchase risky
assets, ￿nanced through their net worth and borrowing by issuing bonds. Before
describing the assets, a couple of points about their borrowing are in order. We
make two simpli￿cations. First, we keep the interest rate on the bond constant at
R. We can think of this for example as an interest rate target of the central bank
that accommodates any excess demand or supply in the bond market. Second, we
assume that the leveraged institutions will make the full payment on their debt. In
the absence of borrowing constraints this re￿ ects a commitment mechanism that
avoids default. In the presence of the borrowing constraints, these constraints are
exactly meant to avoid a default outcome.2
Next consider the assets on the balance sheet of the leveraged institutions. Of
the assets that they inherit from period 0, there are short-term assets that come
due in period 1 and long-term assets with a singular payo⁄in period 2. The assets
that come due in period 1 are introduced in order to generate balance sheet losses,
which are associated with a partial default on these assets in the Home country.
2Even with the borrowing constraints, it is still feasible that the net worth of leveraged
institutions turns negative in the model. For simplicity we assume that lenders are able to
enforce payments through the courts. We therefore abstract from limited liability and from
risk premia that lenders might charge to compensate for the costs of such legal proceedings.
Particularly with the margin constraints, the entire point is to make the probability of such an
outcome very small, so that any risk premia that might result are not large anyway. Lenders
then respond to increased risk by demanding more collateral as opposed to raising the lending
rate. In Section 4.6 we consider some of the implications that may arise when we relax the no
default assumption.
3We assume an initial balance sheet for Home leveraged institutions in period
0 that looks as follows. The net worth is W0 and borrowing is B0. The value of
the assets that will come due in period 1 is L0. The value of the other assets,
whose payments will occur in period 2, is then W0 + B0 ￿ L0. For both short and
long-term assets it is assumed that a fraction ￿ is invested in Home assets and a
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ in Foreign assets. We assume ￿ > 0:5 as a result of portfolio home
bias.
In the absence of default it is assumed that the payment on the short term assets
in period 1 is (1 + R)L0, for simplicity setting the return equal to the borrowing
rate. The shock that we will consider in the model is default on a fraction ￿ of
the Home short-term assets. In the context of the 2007-2008 crisis one can think
of this as related for example to mortgage defaults or losses on mortgage backed
securities.
In period 1 the Home leveraged institutions then receive
(1 + R)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿))L0 = (1 + R)(1 ￿ ￿￿)L0
Foreign leveraged institutions inherit the same holdings from period 0, except that
we assume that they invest a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ in Home assets and ￿ in Foreign
assets, which gives rise to a symmetric home bias. The payment that they receive
in period 1 on the short-term assets is then
(1 + R)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))L0 = (1 + R)(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)L0
With ￿ > 0:5 the losses experienced by Home leveraged institutions will be larger
as they have more exposure to the Home defaults.
From here on the focus will be on the long-term assets, which we will simply
refer to as the Home and Foreign assets. The period 0 price of these assets is Q0.
The quantities of the Home and Foreign assets held in period 0 by Home leveraged
institutions are therefore ￿(W0+B0￿L0)=Q0 and (1￿￿)(W0+B0￿L0)=Q0. Let
QH and QF be the prices of the Home and Foreign assets in period 1. The net




(W0 + B0 ￿ L0)(￿QH + (1 ￿ ￿)QF) + (1 + R)((1 ￿ ￿￿)L0 ￿ B0) (1)
where ￿ = 0 without defaults and ￿ > 0 with defaults. Analogously, the period 1




(W0+B0￿L0)((1 ￿ ￿)QH + ￿QF)+(1+R)(1￿(1￿￿)￿)L0￿B0) (2)
4In period 2 the Home and Foreign (long-term) assets have a payo⁄ of respec-
tively DH and DF. These payo⁄s are stochastic. For now we assume that they are
uncorrelated across countries, although in Section 4 we consider a generalization
with correlated payo⁄s. We introduce home bias in the period 1 optimal holdings
by assuming that domestic leveraged institutions are better informed about do-
mestic asset payo⁄s than foreign leveraged institutions. Speci￿cally, the perceived
variance of DH is ￿2 for Home leveraged institutions and ￿2=(1 ￿ ￿) for Foreign
leveraged institutions, with ￿ > 0 measuring the extent of information asymme-
try generating portfolio home bias. Analogously, the perceived variance of DF is
￿2 and ￿2=(1 ￿ ￿) for respectively Foreign and Home leveraged institutions. The
expected payo⁄s in both countries are D.
In period 1 the Home leveraged institutions purchase respectively KHH and
KHF of Home and Foreign assets and borrow KHHQH +KHFQF ￿WH. The gross
portfolio return on their net worth is then
R
p
H = 1 + R +
KHH
WH
(DH ￿ (1 + R)QH) +
KHF
WH
(DF ￿ (1 + R)QF) (3)





problem is analogous for Foreign leveraged institutions.
It is useful to point out that the Home and Foreign assets could in principle
be either standard securities (stocks, bonds), asset backed securities, or regular
loans. When they are loans, the price is related to the interest rate on the loan.
For example, let ￿ D be the upper bound of the payo⁄s DH and DF. This is the
payment on the loans in the absence of default. Lower values are a result of partial
default in period 2. One-period lending rates in period 1 are then ￿ D=QH for Home
loans and ￿ D=QF for Foreign loans.
Non-leveraged investors face an analogous portfolio maximization problem, ex-
cept that for now we assume that they start period 1 with a given wealth WNL in
both countries. We therefore abstract from a feedback from asset prices back to
the wealth of these other investors. This is meant to focus on the role of leveraged
institutions for which Krugman (2008) and others emphasized such feedback ef-
3Assuming simple mean-variance preferences as opposed to expected utility preferences is not
critical to any of the results. It has the advantage of allowing for a closed form solution to the
portfolio problem, which helps in making the results more transparent. If instead we assume
constant relative risk-aversion preferences and take a linear approximation of the portfolio Euler
equation, we get the same portfolio expressions.
5fects. One way to interpret this is that any capital gains are simply consumed by
the non-leveraged agents. In Section 4 we consider an extension where the wealth
of non-leveraged investors does depend on asset prices.
The rate of risk-aversion is assumed to be much higher for the non-leveraged
investors, which is exactly what makes them non-leveraged. We denote their
risk-aversion as ￿NL, which is the same in both countries. We assume that non-
leveraged investors have the same perceived risk of the asset payo⁄s as the leveraged
institutions, with the same information asymmetry across countries.
The description of the model so far is the same whether the leveraged insti-
tutions face balance sheet constraints or not. We now complete the model by
considering optimal portfolios both with and without balance sheet constraints
and imposing market equilibrium.
2.2 Equilibrium without Balance Sheet Constraints
In the absence of balance sheet constraints, optimization leads to simple mean-
variance portfolios. The optimal holdings of Home and Foreign assets by Home
leveraged institutions are
KHH =
D ￿ (1 + R)QH
￿￿2 WH (4)
KHF = (1 ￿ ￿)
D ￿ (1 + R)QF
￿￿2 WH (5)
The portfolios for the non-leveraged Home investors are exactly the same, with
risk-aversion replaced by ￿NL and wealth by WNL.
Similarly, let KFH and KFF be the fractions invested in Home and Foreign
assets by the Foreign leveraged institutions. Their optimal portfolios are then
KFH = (1 ￿ ￿)
D ￿ (1 + R)QH
￿￿2 WF (6)
KFF =
D ￿ (1 + R)QF
￿￿2 WF (7)
Again, analogous expressions hold for Foreign non-leveraged investors.
Market clearing implies that the total demand for Home assets is equal to the
supply K, and similarly for Foreign assets. Using the portfolio expressions we can
6write these market clearing conditions as






















2.3 Constant Leverage Constraint
Next consider a constant leverage constraint. Leverage, which is the ratio of assets
to net worth, can be no larger than ￿. For Home and Foreign leveraged institutions
this implies respectively
QHKHH + QFKHF ￿ ￿WH (10)
QHKFH + QFKFF ￿ ￿WF (11)
Since borrowing is equal to the assets minus net worth, we can also write this in








(QHKFH + QFKFF) (13)
where BH and BF are borrowing by Home and Foreign leveraged institutions in
period 1.
These types of borrowing constraints are by now standard fare in the litera-
ture. Sometimes they are motivated by assuming that the owners of leveraged
institutions can run away with a fraction 1=￿ of the assets. The constraint is then
imposed to make sure that there is no incentive to do so. A more sensible inter-
pretation though is to think of these constraints as capital requirements that are
imposed by regulatory institutions, with 1=￿ the required capital as a fraction of
assets.
Under these constant leverage constraints, the expressions for the optimal port-
folios remain the same as before, with the only di⁄erence that 1 + R is replaced
by 1 + R + ￿H and 1 + R + ￿F for respectively Home and Foreign leveraged insti-
tutions. Here ￿i is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the leverage constraint
in country i. ￿i is positive if the constraint is binding in country i. The lever-
age constraint, if it becomes binding, therefore has an e⁄ect that is equivalent
7to an increase in the borrowing rate. We denote the e⁄ective borrowing rates as
RH = R + ￿H and RF = R + ￿F.
If the constraint is binding, we can solve for the Lagrange multipliers by sub-
stituting the optimal portfolios in the constraints with an equality sign. This gives
1 + RH =
(QH + (1 ￿ ￿)QF)D ￿ ￿￿￿2
Q2
H + (1 ￿ ￿)Q2
F
(14)
1 + RF =





Equilibrium in the asset markets is now represented by
D ￿ (1 + RH)QH
￿￿2 WH +
D ￿ (1 + RF)QH
￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)WF
+
D ￿ (1 + R)QH
￿NL￿2 (2 ￿ ￿)WNL = K (16)
D ￿ (1 + RH)QF
￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)WH +
D ￿ (1 + RF)QF
￿￿2 WF
+
D ￿ (1 + R)QF
￿NL￿2 (2 ￿ ￿)WNL = K (17)
2.4 Margin Constraints
We ￿nally consider risk based constraints in the form of margin constraints. Such
constraints are valid for collateralized lending. Most of the so-called shadow bank-
ing system (e.g. broker-dealers and hedge funds) uses primarily collateralized
borrowing, especially in the form of repos contracts. We adopt standard margin
constraints that are widely used in the literature and in everyday practice, limiting
the risk that the collateral will be insu¢ cient to pay the debt to a small probability
￿.4
We consider the case where the entire value of the assets is put up as collateral
for the borrowing. The constraint then says that the probability that the value of
the assets next period is less than what is owed on the debt should be no larger
than ￿. Recall that total borrowing of Home leveraged institutions is KHHQH +
KHFQF ￿ WH. Therefore the constraint is
Prob(KHHDH + KHFDF < (1 + R)(KHHQH + KHFQF ￿ WH)) ￿ ￿ (18)
4See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for a detailed discussion of the institutional features
leading to these margin constraints.
8or
Prob(KHH(DH￿(1+R)QH)+KHF(DF ￿(1+R)QF)+(1+R)WH < 0) ￿ ￿ (19)
This is the case when













where z = ￿￿￿1(￿) and ￿(:) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.5
z is positive and approaches in￿nity as ￿ ! 0. (20) says that portfolio risk (its
standard deviation) needs to be less than or equal to a fraction 1=z of the expected
value of the portfolio.
Note that this can also be written as a borrowing constraint. With borrowing


















Importantly, the borrowing constraint limits borrowing not to the value of the
collateral today, but the expected value of the collateral tomorrow adjusted for
risk. The risk gets a higher weight the smaller ￿ and therefore the larger z.
The optimal holdings of Home and Foreign assets by leveraged Home investors
are now
KHH =
D ￿ (1 + R)QH
￿H￿2 WH (22)
KHF = (1 ￿ ￿)











and ￿H is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the margin constraint.
The only impact of the margin constraint on the optimal portfolios of leveraged
institutions is to a⁄ect their e⁄ective rate of risk-aversion. The rate of risk-aversion
5This implicitly assumes that the asset payo⁄s are normally distributed.
9￿ is replaced by the e⁄ective rate of risk-aversion ￿H in the optimal portfolios
of leveraged Home institutions. When the margin constraint does not bind, so
that ￿H = 0, it is immediate that ￿H = ￿ and there is no change. When the
margin constraint does bind, ￿H can be computed by making the constraint (20)

















where sH = (D ￿ (1 + R)QH)=￿ and sF = (D ￿ (1 + R)QF)=￿ are Sharpe ratios.
Two opposite forces a⁄ect ￿H in response to a shock that reduces asset prices.
On the one hand, expected excess payo⁄s D ￿ (1 + R)Qi rise, which weaken the
constraint. On the other hand, these higher expected excess payo⁄s increase lever-
age, which increase risk. In the calibration in Section 4 it is this second factor that
strongly dominates, leading to an increase in risk-aversion.
The results for Foreign leveraged institutions are analogous, leading to an ef-

















Market clearing conditions now become




























3 Impact of Home Defaults
We now consider the impact on Home and Foreign asset prices of balance sheet
losses due to Home defaults in period 1. We start from a symmetric equilibrium
where ￿ = 0 and then consider the impact of Home defaults by considering a
marginal increase in ￿. We compute the impact on asset prices by di⁄erentiating
the market equilibrium conditions around the point where ￿ = 0.
3.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
It is useful to ￿rst discuss the symmetric equilibrium before introducing the impact
of the defaults. We will assume that in the presence of balance sheet constraints,
10these constraints are on the margin of starting to bind in the symmetric equilib-
rium. They will strictly bind once the economy is hit by the shock. Therefore
the symmetric equilibrium is exactly the same for the three cases discussed in the
previous section, with and without balance sheet constraints.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the mean dividend D such that QH =
QF = 1 in this symmetric equilibrium. We set Q0 = 1=(1 + R), so that the return
on the (long-term) assets from period 0 to 1 is R. This is just a simpli￿cation,
which is not important to the results. De￿ne W = WH = WF, which is wealth of
leveraged institutions at the beginning of period 1. We then have W = (1+R)W0.
De￿ne leverage as the ratio of the value of Home plus Foreign assets relative to
net worth. Leverage in period 0 is equal to6
LEV =
W0 + B0 ￿ L0
W0
(29)
De￿ne ￿ W = WNL￿=￿NL. This is a risk-aversion adjusted level of wealth of
non-leveraged investors that has the same impact on asset demand as the wealth
W of leveraged investors. Imposing asset market equilibrium gives the equilibrium
expected excess return:




W + ￿ W
(30)





W + ￿ W
(31)
We set K such that this is equal to leverage (29) in period 0.
Finally, we set ￿ = 1=(2 ￿ ￿), so that the fraction invested in assets of the
domestic country is the same in periods 0 and 1. We also de￿ne the share of risky
assets held by leveraged institutions in the symmetric equilibrium as SHARE,
which is equal to W=(W + ￿ W).
3.2 Impact of Shock without Balance Sheet Constraints
We now consider the impact of marginal Home defaults. De￿ne LOSS = L0d￿=W0.
This is the value of Home defaults, scaled by initial net worth. De￿ne ￿ dQH and
6Here we do not include the short-term assets in the de￿nition of leverage to be consistent
with period 1, where there are only long-term assets. Including them makes little di⁄erence to
leverage in the application in the next section as we need only a small amount of the short-term
assets coming due in period 1 in order to generate a large drop in net worth due to defaults.
11￿ dQF as the asset prices changes in the absence of balance sheet constraints. Fully
di⁄erentiating the asset market clearing conditions around the symmetric equilib-
rium where ￿ = 0, we get











PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS (32)











PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS (33)
where
d1 = 1 + R ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LEV (34)
d2 = 1 + R ￿
￿2
(2 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LEV (35)
The algebra behind this result, as well as others in this section, can be found in
the Appendix.
The Home asset price clearly falls, while the Foreign asset price falls as long as
￿ < 1. The case of ￿ = 1 is an extreme of ￿nancial autarky, where only domestic
assets are held and there is no transmission to the Foreign country ( ￿ dQF = 0).
The other extreme case is ￿ = 0, where there is perfect portfolio diversi￿cation. In
that case Home and Foreign asset prices drop by the same amount, so that there is
one-to-one transmission to the Foreign country. The more interesting and realistic
cases though lie in between, where 0 < ￿ < 1 and portfolios are only partially
diversi￿ed across countries. Transmission is then partial in that the Foreign asset
prices drops by less than the Home asset price.
There are three channels of transmission of the shock to the Foreign country.
In order to see this, it is useful to disentangle the various exposures that the
countries have to each other. There are three types. Consider the Foreign leveraged
institutions. First, they inherit claims from period 0 on Home short-terms assets
on which the defaults take place. Second, they inherit claims from period 0 on
Home long-terms assets. And ￿nally, they partially invest their portfolio in period
1 in Home assets.
These three types of exposures lead to three di⁄erent transmission mechanisms
through which the Foreign country is a⁄ected. The ￿rst is through balance sheet
losses associated with the Home assets on which defaults take place. This is a direct
exposure channel. The second is through further balance sheet losses due to a drop
12in the prices of Home (long-term) assets to which Foreign leveraged institutions are
exposed. This is a standard balance sheet valuation channel. And ￿nally there is
a portfolio growth channel. The drop in net worth of Home leveraged institutions
leads to a drop in their demand for Foreign assets in period 1. One can also think
of this as a lending channel to the extent that the assets consist of loans rather
than securities.
In the model we have assumed that these three types of cross-border ￿nancial
exposures are identical and can be summarized with a single ￿. But in order to
understand their separate roles in transmission, it is useful to disentangle them.
First consider the direct exposure channel. In order to isolate this, assume that
there are no cross-border holdings of the long-term assets, either in period 0 or 1.
It is easy to show that in this case
dQH = ￿
1
2￿￿ ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS




2￿￿ ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS
1 + R ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LEV
(37)
Since the portfolio shares invested in Home short-term assets are respectively
￿ = 1=(2 ￿ ￿) and 1 ￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=(2 ￿ ￿) for Home and Foreign leveraged
institutions, the exposure of Foreign institutions to the Home assets on which
the defaults take place is a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the exposure by Home institutions.
Corresponding to that, (36)-(37) show that the drop in the Foreign asset price is
a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the drop in the Home asset price. Transmission only depends
on ￿. The closer it is to 1 (the bigger the home bias), the lower the transmission.
Higher leverage and a larger asset share held by leveraged institutions only a⁄ect
the overall drop in asset prices, not the relative drop of the Foreign to the Home
asset price.7
7A higher asset share of leveraged institutions raises the response of asset prices to the shock
in two ways. First, the shock itself matters more the larger the relative size of the leveraged
institutions that are hit by the shock. Second, there is an ampli￿cation e⁄ect when asset prices
go down as it reduces the net worth of leveraged institutions more. The larger the relative size
of leveraged institutions, the more this ampli￿cation matters for equilibrium prices. This latter
e⁄ect is also enhanced the more leveraged the institutions are as a given drop in asset prices
reduces their net worth more when they are more leveraged. Also note that leverage matters
indirectly by a⁄ecting the share of risky assets held by leveraged institutions, which can be
written as SHARE = (W=￿)=[(W=￿)+(WNL=￿NL)]. More leverage is the result of a drop in ￿.
13In what follows it is useful to also write (36)-(37) in terms of changes in the
average asset price and the di⁄erence in asset prices, denoted QA = 0:5(QH +QF)
and QD = QH ￿ QF. When there is only transmission through direct exposure,
we have
dQA = ￿0:5
PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS




2￿￿ ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS
1 + R ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LEV
(39)
Next we bring on board the balance sheet valuation channel by assuming that
leveraged institutions inherit diversi￿ed claims on the long-term assets from period
0. Institutions invest a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=(2 ￿ ￿) in the asset of the other
country. In that case the drop in the Home asset price leads to a further balance
sheet loss for Foreign leveraged institutions, providing an additional transmission
mechanism. The change in the average asset price remains the same as in (38)
because we have simply reshu› ed the losses from the Home price decline away
from Home leveraged institutions and towards Foreign leveraged institutions. The
additional transmission to the Foreign country reduces the di⁄erence between the
decline in Home and Foreign asset prices, which is now
dQD = ￿
￿
2￿￿ ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS
1 + R ￿ ￿
2￿￿ ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LEV
(40)
This is smaller than in (39), which implies a larger decline in the Foreign asset
price relative to the decline in the Home asset price.
We ￿nally introduce the third transmission channel, through optimal portfolio
allocation in period 1. This leads to additional transmission to the Foreign country
as the lower net worth of Home leveraged institutions leads to a drop in their
demand for Foreign assets. The change in the average asset price remains the same
as in (38) because the change here involves a reshu› ing of portfolio allocation, with
a larger decline in demand now falling on Foreign assets and a smaller decline on
Home assets. This third transmission mechanism leads to a further reduction in
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￿2 ￿ PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LEV
(41)
8It is easily checked that (32)-(33) correspond to (38) and (41) when using QH = QA+0:5QD
and QF = QA ￿ 0:5QD.
14The bottom line from all of this is that the transmission to the Foreign country
may be larger than suggested by the ￿nancial exposures themselves. Even though
Foreign leveraged institutions have an exposure to Home assets that is only a
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the exposure by Home leveraged institutions, the relative drop
in the Foreign asset price is clearly larger than 1 ￿ ￿. The reason for this is the
cumulative e⁄ect of the various transmission channels.
We can provide further insight into the magnitude of these transmission chan-
nels by considering the results in terms of order calculus. A shock in the model, or
a standard deviation of shocks, is ￿rst-order. Therefore d￿ and ￿ are ￿rst-order.
Analogously, ￿2 is second-order and ￿2d￿ is third-order. The zero-order compo-
nent of a variable is its value in the absence of shocks (￿ ! 0 in the symmetric
equilibrium). SHARE = W=(W + ￿ W) and LEV = K=(W + ￿ W) are zero-order
as they do not depend on shocks or ￿. LOSS is ￿rst-order as it is proportional to
d￿. PREM is second-order as it is proportional to ￿2 from (30).
It is now easy to check that changes in asset prices are third-order through
the product of PREM and LOSS in the numerator of all the expressions above.
There is also a term that depends on PREM in the denominators, as well as in d1
and d2. These contribute to a ￿fth-order component of the change in asset prices,
which tends to be quite small. If we focus on the third-order component, which is
the dominant component of asset price changes, we can drop the terms in PREM
in the denominators and in d1 and d2.













PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS (43)
This again shows that the drop in the Foreign asset price is a fraction 1￿￿ of the
drop in the Home asset price. It is useful for what follows to understand why the
changes in asset prices are third-order. The defaults lead to a ￿rst-order drop in
net worth of leveraged institutions, which leads to a ￿rst-order drop in demand for
assets. In order to generate equilibrium it is su¢ cient to have a third-order drop
in asset prices. The resulting third-order increase in the expected excess return
leads to a ￿rst-order increase in demand for the risky assets as the expected excess
return is divided by ￿2 in the optimal portfolios.
15These changes in asset prices remain unchanged when we add transmission
through balance sheet valuation e⁄ects. Balance sheet valuation e⁄ects, while
theoretically present, are very small. The reason is that the changes in equilibrium
asset prices, which are third-order, have a third-order e⁄ect on net worth. This
is two orders of magnitude smaller than the impact of the defaults on net worth,
which is ￿rst-order. The additional drop in asset prices that is needed to clear the
market is then of ￿fth-order, which is tends to be quite small.





















PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS (45)













￿2 > 1 ￿ ￿
There is now a larger decline in demand for Foreign assets, which is ￿rst-order,
and lower decline in demand for Home assets, accounting for the additional trans-
mission.
It is also useful to note that the extent of transmission only depends on ￿
and not on leverage or the share of wealth held by leveraged institutions. To get
some sense of the numbers, consider ￿ = 0:85, so that 85% is invested in domestic
assets. In Section 4 we will argue that this is pretty close to reality. In that case
￿ = 0:8235. The drop in the Foreign asset price relative to the drop in the Home
asset prices is then a fraction 0.18 with only the direct exposure channel present
and 0.34 when the portfolio allocation channel is added. Total transmission is
therefore about one third, which is not very big. But we have not yet considered
the impact of the borrowing constraints.
163.3 Impact of Shock with Constant Leverage Constraints
Next consider the case where there is a constant leverage constraint. Fully di⁄er-




















e1 = 1 ￿
1 + R ￿ PREM
d1
SHARE (49)
e2 = 1 ￿
￿2
(2 ￿ ￿)2
1 + R ￿ PREM
d2
SHARE (50)
We will again consider the case where 0 < ￿ < 1 as the extremes of ￿ = 1
(￿nancial autarky) and ￿ = 0 (perfect diversi￿cation) again give the previous
results of no transmission (dQF = 0) and perfect transmission (dQF = dQH).
When 0 < ￿ < 1, we have 0 <   < 1, so that the changes in the asset prices
are a weighted average of the changes in the two asset prices in the absence of
balance sheet constraints, times an ampli￿cation factor. These results imply more
transmission in that the ratio of dQF to dQH is bigger, as well as a larger overall
impact of the shock on asset prices.
The larger overall drop in asset prices, as well as the bigger relative drop in
the Foreign asset price, are a result of the balance sheet constraint that becomes
binding. To see this, we have
dRH = ￿
1 + R ￿ PREM
2 ￿ ￿
(dQH + (1 ￿ ￿)dQF) (51)
dRF = ￿
1 + R ￿ PREM
2 ￿ ￿
((1 ￿ ￿)dQH + dQF) (52)
A drop in asset prices raises the e⁄ective borrowing rates. The reason for this is
that lower asset prices lead to higher expected returns and therefore higher optimal
leverage. The leverage constraints then become binding, which is equivalent to an
increase in the borrowing rate. Higher borrowing rates imply lower asset demand,
which is now an additional ampli￿cation mechanism.
17There is now also a fourth transmission mechanism. The lower Home asset price
raises the expected excess return on the Home asset, which raises the demand
for Home assets by Foreign leveraged institutions. This increases their leverage
and makes the balance sheet constraint of the Foreign leveraged institutions more
binding, raising their e⁄ective borrowing rate. This explains the further increase
in the relative drop of the Foreign asset price.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this additional transmission channel, we
can write the third-order component of the change in asset prices as (46)-(47) with
￿ dQH and ￿ dQF being the third-order components in the absence of the leverage
constraint (in (44)-(45)), e1 = 1 ￿ SHARE and







Clearly   < 1, so that transmission is larger. Just like the balance sheet valuation
channel, the leverage constraint channel operates through changes in asset prices.
But the leverage constraint channel is stronger. The third-order drop in asset
prices leads to a third-order drop in net worth through the balance sheet valuation
channel and a third-order increase in e⁄ective borrowing rates through the leverage
constraint channel. But while the former a⁄ects asset demand only to the third-
order, the latter leads to a ￿rst-order change in asset demand as the expected
excess return is divided by ￿2 in optimal portfolios.
The extent of transmission now depends not only on ￿, but also on SHARE.
While a drop in asset prices raises the expected excess return for all investors (both
leveraged and non-leveraged), the additional impact on the excess return through
e⁄ective borrowing rates is only relevant for leveraged investors. The larger their
relative size, the more this a⁄ects the equilibrium. In comparison to the case with
no borrowing constraints, an increase in SHARE raises both the overall drop in
asset prices and the transmission to the Foreign country. If SHARE becomes very
small, the additional transmission through the leverage constraint vanishes.
Even though we will argue below that it is entirely unrealistic, it is nonetheless
instructive to consider the case where SHARE becomes close to 1 as some of the
literature that we discuss in Section 5 has adopted this approach. SHARE cannot
be exactly 1 in our model. If there are only leveraged institutions there cannot
be an equilibrium in the presence of leverage constraints. This is most easily
understood in the context of a one-country setting. A binding leverage constraint
18in the Home country then implies that the nominal demand for Home assets is
￿WH. This must be equal to the supply QHK to clear the market. A drop
in Home wealth due to mortgage losses lowers demand. Equilibrium cannot be
restored by lowering the price as percentagewise this lowers the Home net worth
more than the price and therefore further reduces demand relative to supply. That
is why we need non-leveraged investors, who will buy the asset when the price
drops.
It follows from (46)-(50) that a ￿nite negative drop in asset prices requires
SHARE < (1 + R)=(1 + R + PREM ￿ (LEV ￿ 1)), which in practice will be
close to 1. When SHARE gets close to this cuto⁄, then e1 ! 0, which means that
dQH becomes ill de￿ned (goes to minus in￿nity). Consider the case where SHARE
gets very close to this cuto⁄, but remains a second order constant below it. In
particular, let SHARE = (1 + R ￿ ￿PREM)=(1 + R + PREM ￿ (LEV ￿ 1)),
where ￿ is a zero order constant. Then clearly SHARE is less than one. But it
is close to 1 as both zero and ￿rst-order components of SHARE are exactly 1. Its
second-order component is 1 ￿ ￿=(1 + R), which is less than 1.
With a little algebra, it follows that in this case asset price changes are now
￿rst-order in magnitude and equal across the two countries to the ￿rst-order. In
particular, we have to the ￿rst-order
dQH = dQF = ￿
0:5
￿
SHARE ￿ LOSS (53)
Transmission is therefore perfect, while the change is asset prices is now much
larger than before: ￿rst-order rather than third-order.
To be sure, this is a rather bizarre case, but it is useful to understand. Leveraged
institutions in this case cannot arbitrage between risky assets and bonds because of
a binding leverage constraint. There are some non-leveraged investors that can do
this arbitrage, but their share in the market for risky assets is tiny. As only these
few non-leveraged investors increase demand for risky assets when the price drops,
a drop in demand for risky assets due to lower net worth of leveraged institutions
will require a very large negative price adjustment to clear the market (￿rst-order
rather than third-order).
At the same time the ￿rst-order price changes of Home and Foreign assets will
be the same because all investors, including leveraged institutions, are able to freely
arbitrage between Home and Foreign assets. While the information friction ￿ leads
to portfolio home bias, to the ￿rst-order expected returns on the two asset must be
19equal as the expected return di⁄erential re￿ ects a risk-premium di⁄erential.9 As
changes in risk premia are zero to the ￿rst-order (they are third-order), it follows
that changes in expected returns on the assets must be equal to the ￿rst order.
Therefore asset price changes will be the same to the ￿rst-order.10
While appealing in terms of the results, it should be emphasized that this case is
unrealistic both because it relies on leveraged institutions holding almost all risky
assets and because of the lack of arbitrage between risky assets and bonds. In
this case the expected excess return between the risky assets and bonds becomes
￿rst-order. This is inconsistent with standard arbitrage, where expected return
di⁄erentials re￿ ect risk premia that are second and higher order.
3.4 Impact of Shock with Margin Constraints





















h1 = 1 ￿
1 + R ￿ PREM ￿ LEV
d1
SHARE (57)
h2 = 1 ￿
￿2
(2 ￿ ￿)2
1 + R ￿ PREM ￿ LEV
d2
SHARE (58)
In what follows we assume that 1 + R > PREM ￿ LEV , which is the case for
reasonable parameterization (see Section 4).
9Using the ￿rst-order conditions for Home leveraged investors, the expected return di⁄erence
D
QH ￿ D
QF is equal to the risk premium di⁄erential ￿ (￿Hvar(RH) ￿ ￿Fvar(RF)), where RH =
D=QH and RF = D=QF are the returns on Home and Foreign assets, ￿H and ￿F are the portfolio
shares invested in Home and Foreign assets (by Home leveraged institutions) and the variances
are return risk from the perspective of Home leveraged institutions.
10Perfect transmission in this case can also be thought of as resulting from an equal ￿rst-order
increase in the e⁄ective borrowing rates RH and RF, which is the fourth transmission channel
due to the leverage constraint.
20The extremes of ￿nancial autarky (￿ = 1) and perfect diversi￿cation (￿ = 0)
again imply respectively perfect transmission and no transmission. When 0 < ￿ <
1, we have 0 < ! < 1, so that the changes in the asset prices are a weighted average
of the changes in the two asset prices in the absence of balance sheet constraints,
times an ampli￿cation factor. This is analogous to the results under a constant
leverage constraint. These results again imply larger transmission and a bigger
overall impact of the shock on asset prices.
The larger overall drop in asset prices, as well as the bigger transmission to the
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1 + R ￿ PREM ￿ LEV
2 ￿ ￿
((1 ￿ ￿)dQH + dQF) (60)
A drop in asset prices raises the e⁄ective rates of risk-aversion. The reason
for this is that lower asset prices lead to higher expected returns and therefore
higher optimal leverage. This in turn leads to increased balance sheet risk, so
that the margin constraints become binding. As discussed in Section 2, there
is one o⁄setting factor. Holding leverage constant, the higher expected returns
themselves make the margin constraints less binding. This is especially the case
when leverage is high to begin with. However, as long as 1+R > PREM ￿LEV ,
the increase in risk dominates. The constraints then become more binding, which
implies an increase in e⁄ective risk-aversion.
Higher e⁄ective rates of risk-aversion reduce asset demand, which accounts for
the further drop in asset prices. Just as was the case for the constant leverage
constraint, there is now also a fourth transmission channel. The lower Home asset
price raises the expected excess return on Home assets, which raises demand for
Home assets by the Foreign leveraged institutions and makes them more leveraged.
This leads the margin constraint to bind more and therefore the e⁄ective rate of
risk-aversion to rise. This leads to a further drop in the relative demand for Foreign
assets and therefore a larger relative decline in the price of the Foreign asset.
If we consider the third-order component of the change in asset prices in this
case, it is easy to see that it is exactly the same as in the case of a constant leverage
constraint. This is because the zero-order components of h1 and h2 are the same
as those for respectively e1 and e2. Therefore the zero-order component of ! is
21the same as that for  . Surprisingly therefore, while the nature of the constraint
is a very di⁄erent one, up to third-order they have the same impact on the asset
prices.
Just like for the case of a constant leverage constraint, the results again depend
critically on SHARE. It is again the case that when SHARE is a second order
constant below 1, say SHARE = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PREM, then asset price changes will
be ￿rst-order and equal across the two countries to the ￿rst-order. The intuition
is analogous to that discussed under the constant leverage constraint. While we
have already argued that this extreme case is unrealistic, it goes to show that the
impact of leveraged institutions can at least in theory be very large when they
dominate ￿nancial markets, both in terms of the magnitude of the price impact
and transmission.
4 Numerical Results
We next calibrate the model parameters in order to quantify the magnitude of
the overall transmission of the shock to the Foreign country. In contrast to the
theoretical exercise in the previous section, we now consider a large default shock.
We set ￿ = 0:565 and L0=W = 1, which under the benchmark parameterization
discussed below implies that the net worth of Home leveraged institutions is cut
exactly in half due to the Home defaults.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the parameters to the solution of the model under the symmetric
equilibrium where ￿ = 0 (no defaults). First consider the values of LEV , SHARE
and PREM. As discussed below, these are related to structural model parameters.
We set leverage in period 0 and 1 equal to LEV =12. This number is based on an
estimate by Greenlaw et.al. (2008), which is based on the entire leveraged ￿nancial
sector (commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions, ￿nance companies,
brokers/hedge funds and GSEs) at the end of 2007.
Based on the same de￿nition of leveraged funds, we set SHARE=0.2. In the
model this is the share of risky assets held by leveraged institutions. We calibrate it
using the U.S. Flow of Funds data. We de￿ne risky assets as the sum of corporate
bonds, bank loans, other loans, mortgages, consumer credit, corporate equities and
22equity in non-corporate business. The total at the end of 2007 was 61.3 trillion
dollars. We then compute the value of these assets held by leveraged ￿nancial
institutions, de￿ned the same way as above, subtracting any liabilities that they
may have in these same assets. The total is 11.9 trillion dollars. This is a share of
19%, which we round up to 20% for our calibration.
We set PREM=0.02. Based on FDIC data for U.S. commercial banks from
2000 to 2007, the average net operating pro￿ts as a fraction of assets was 1.22%.
Since other less regulated leveraged institutions (such as broker/dealers and hedge
funds) surely earn higher average returns, we assume an average excess return of
2%.
The values of LEV , SHARE and PREM translate into values of various
structural parameters. Note that W = (1+R)W0 from the previous section. LEV
at time 0 gives us a value of (W0 + B0 ￿ L0)=W0, which in turn gives a value of
B0=W0 as we already assumed L0=W = 1. SHARE gives us a value of W= ￿ W.
LEV at time 1 then gives us a value of K=W. Finally, PREM and LEV are used
to set ￿ from (30):
￿￿




This also uses ￿, which we discuss below. Note that only the product ￿￿2 a⁄ects
the equilibrium. We can therefore set ￿ at any arbitrary level and then choose ￿
such that this equation is satis￿ed. The breakdown between ￿ and ￿ is irrelevant
for the results.
We will report our results in the form of pictures that relate the percentage drop
in asset prices to values of ￿ = 1=(1￿￿) ranging from 0.5 (full diversi￿cation) to 1
(complete home bias). But it is critical to know where we are in this range, which
varies all the way from perfect transmission to no transmission. Fidora, Fratzscher
and Thimann (2007) report that the United States invests 86% in domestic equity
and 95% in domestic debt securities. This is based on data over the period 2001-
2003. The numbers are not much di⁄erent for ￿nancial institutions. Buch et.al.
(2010) reports that 89% of the assets of U.S. banks in 2004 are domestic. This
abstracts from foreign subsidiaries. But Garc￿a-Herrero and Vazquez (2007) report
that U.S. bank holding companies hold only 6% of assets in foreign subsidiaries.
This is actually an overstatement as it includes only those banks that are large
and have at least 3 foreign subsidiaries. So overall the fraction of assets held at
home is probably somewhere around 85%. This implies ￿ = 0:85 and ￿ = 0:8235.
23It is useful to point out that ￿ = 0:85 is also consistent with data on direct
exposure to U.S. asset backed securities by foreign leveraged institutions. ￿ = 0:85
implies that 85% of the exposure to asset backed securities is by U.S. leveraged
institutions and 15% by Foreign leveraged institutions. Estimates by Beltran,
Pounder and Thomas (2008) of foreign exposure to U.S. asset backed securities
as of June 2007 are equal to 19% of all U.S. asset backed securities (see also
Kamin and Pounder Demarco (2010)). Similarly, Greenlaw at. al. (2008) estimate
that foreign leveraged institutions held 16% of the total U.S. subprime mortgage
exposure.
We set the riskfree rate R at 0.008, based on Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Also, as mentioned in the previous section, without loss of generality we set D
such that the asset prices are equal to 1 in the symmetric equilibrium. There
is one additional parameter for the constant leverage constraint, which is ￿. We
set it such that the constraint just binds in the symmetric equilibrium. This is
the case for ￿ = LEV . Similarly, under margin constraints z is set such that
the constraint just binds in the symmetric equilibrium, which is the case when
￿z = (2 ￿ ￿)0:5((1 + r)=LEV + PREM).
4.2 Graphical Results
Figure 1 shows the percentage drop in the Home and Foreign asset prices as a
function of ￿ = 1=(2 ￿ ￿), the fraction invested in domestic assets. Under the
benchmark parameterization we assume ￿ = 0:85.
Figure 1 shows that as we increase home bias, the Home price drops more while
the Foreign price drops less. A rise in ￿ implies that the losses from the defaults
fall more on Home leveraged institutions. In addition, for given relative losses of
Home leveraged institutions, increased home bias in period 1 implies that more of
the drop in asset demand a⁄ects the Home assets. The same factors imply that
the Foreign asset price is less a⁄ected when home bias increases, up to the point
where ￿ = 1 and the Foreign asset price is una⁄ected.
Three key conclusions can be drawn from Figure 1. First, transmission is
relatively small. Second, borrowing constraints have little impact. Third, the
magnitude of the price impact is also small. Under the benchmark parameteriza-
tion where ￿ = 0:85 the impact on the Foreign asset price is only one third of the
impact on the Home asset price in the absence of borrowing constraints. It is only
24slightly higher with leverage constraints (fraction 0.40 for constant leverage and
0.38 with margin constraints).
The magnitude of the impact is quite small as well. Even though the shock
cuts the total net worth of leveraged institutions in half, the Foreign asset price
in Figure 3 drops by at most 0.09% (with constant leverage constraint) when
￿ = 0:85. This is clearly tiny relative to the large drop in asset prices seen during
the crisis. If we think of the asset as a loan, for which the gross lending rate is
￿ D=QF, when it translates into an increase in the Foreign lending rate by about 9
basis points. This is again very small. Even if we double the shock, which would
reduce the net worth of Home leveraged institutions to zero, the impact on the
Foreign lending rate is still only 18 basis points.
Figure 2 considers a counterfactual experiment where we raise SHARE to 0.5,
assuming that leveraged ￿nancial institutions hold half of all risky assets. While
this is much larger than in reality, it still does not alter the main conclusions. Con-
sistent with the results in Section 3, increasing the asset share of leveraged institu-
tions has two implications, which only hold under binding borrowing constraints
(either leverage or margin constraints). First, it increases the overall impact of the
shock on asset prices. Second, it increases transmission.
Transmission in the absence of borrowing constraints remains about one third
when ￿ = 0:85. With a constant leverage constraint transmission is increased from
0.40 to 0.52. With margin constraints it is increased from 0.38 to 0.44. Therefore
even with this large asset share of leveraged institutions, transmission is at most
one half. The impact of the shock on the asset prices, while much larger than
before, remains rather small. The biggest drop in the Foreign asset price, which
occurs under a constant leverage constraint, is 0.5%. This corresponds to a 50
basis points increase in the Foreign lending rate.
Two other key parameters are LEV and PREM. Consistent with the results
in Section 3, changing these parameters mainly impacts the magnitude of the asset
price changes, with little e⁄ect on transmission.
4.3 Two Extensions
We ￿nally consider two extensions: correlated asset payo⁄s and feedback e⁄ects
from asset prices to the wealth of non-leveraged investors.
We introduce a positive correlation in a way analogous to Okawa and van Win-
25coop (2010). The Home and Foreign dividends are respectively DH = D+￿H +￿W
and DF = D + ￿F + ￿W, where ￿H and ￿F are country speci￿c dividend innova-
tions and ￿W is a global innovation. The global and country-speci￿c innovations
are uncorrelated. The standard deviation of the global innovation is ￿2
w. For the
country-speci￿c innovations we continue to assume the information asymmetry.
For example, the variance of ￿H is ￿2 from the perspective of Home investors and
￿2=(1￿￿) from the perspective of Foreign investors. The variance-covariance ma-
























This of course a⁄ects asset demand. For example, in the absence of borrowing












D ￿ (1 + R)QH
D ￿ (1 + R)QF
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WH (63)
For data purposes we treat the standard deviation of the country-speci￿c shocks
as ￿2, so that the correlation between the asset returns is 1=(1+￿2
w=￿2). In Figure
3 we report results when we set ￿2
w=￿2 such that this correlation is 0.3. This is
probably an upper-bound of what is reasonable based on cross-country correlations
of stock and bond returns.11
Introducing a positive correlation leads to a ￿fth transmission channel, which
is an arbitrage channel. When the correlation between Home and Foreign assets
is zero, a change in the expected return on the Home asset has no e⁄ect on the
demand for the Foreign asset. There is only a switch between the Home asset
and the bond. With a positive correlation, the Home and Foreign assets become
substitutes. A drop in the Home asset price, which raises the expected excess
11Buch et.al. (2010) approximate cross-country bank returns with cross-country government
bond returns. Using cross-country correlations for 5-year government bond returns among 13
industrialized countries from Cappiello et.al. (2006), together with data on the relative size of
these government bond markets, we ￿nd a correlation between the U.S. bond return and an
aggregate of non-U.S. bond returns of 0.18. This is less than the correlation between stock
returns. For example, Dumas et.al. (2002) report a correlation of 0.54 between the U.S. stock
return and the aggregate stock return in the rest of the world. But leveraged ￿nancial institutions
do not hold a lot of stock.
26return on the Home asset, now leads to a portfolio shift away from Foreign assets
to Home assets. This leads to a larger drop in the Foreign asset price than before
and therefore larger transmission. Relative to the benchmark parameterization
the transmission coe¢ cient is increased from 0.34 to 0.44 without borrowing con-
straints, from 0.40 to 0.50 with constant leverage constraints and from 0.38 to 0.48
with margin constraints. It therefore remains the case that the Foreign asset price
drops by less than half as much as the Home asset price.
The second extension is to allow the wealth of non-leveraged investors to de-
pend on asset prices. So far we have assumed that the wealth of non-leveraged
institutions at the start of period 1 is a given WNL that does not depend on asset
prices. Instead now assume that for Home non-leveraged investors it is
WNL(￿(￿QH + (1 ￿ ￿)QF) + 1 ￿ ￿)
It therefore remains equal to WNL in the symmetric equilibrium where QH = QF =
1. But now wealth drops in response to the shock as asset prices fall. It is assumed
that a fraction ￿ of wealth is sensitive to asset prices and of that a fraction ￿ to
the Home asset price and 1 ￿ ￿ to the Foreign asset price. This is analogous to
the assumption for leveraged institutions, with the only exception that there ￿ > 1
due to leverage, while here we assume ￿ < 1 as investors inherit non-leveraged
positions from the previous period.
The impact of this change on the results turns out to be negligible. Even when
we set ￿ equal to 1 (the maximum without leverage), the previously reported
transmission numbers remain the same. It has a very small ￿fth order e⁄ect that
is analogous to the balance sheet valuation channel for leveraged institutions.
We should also point out that making the wealth of non-leveraged investors a
positive function of asset prices has an e⁄ect similar to that of making the supply
of capital K in the two countries a negative function of the asset prices. This would
be the case if for example we introduce investment to the model, which depends
negatively on asset prices through a Tobin￿ s q e⁄ect. Or alternatively, as discussed
in Section 2, we could interpret the assets as loans with the interest rates inversely
related to the asset prices. Then a negative relationship between the demand for
loans and the interest rate also implies a positive relationship between K and Q.
Since this is all similar to making WNL a negative function of asset prices,
the impact on the changes of equilibrium asset prices remains virtually identical.
One new result develops though if we do this. Investment, or more generally the
27demand for loans, will drop. The drop will be of third-order, proportional to the
third-order drop in asset prices. The impact of the shock on the real side of the two
economies will then be proportional to the impact on their asset prices. Limited
transmission to the Foreign asset price will then translate into limited transmission
to the Foreign real economy.
4.4 Transmission Outside of Europe
Kamin and Pounder Demarco (2010) document that the lion share of the foreign
exposure to U.S. asset backed securities (84% of it) was held in European and
o⁄shore banking centers during the crisis. This means that only about 3% of U.S.
ABS are held outside of the U.S., Europe and Carribean. This makes it even
more remarkable that the rest of the world (outside of the U.S. and Europe) was
similarly a⁄ected in terms of GDP growth and stock price declines. In order to
consider the transmission outside of Europe, we can consider an application of
the model where the Home country combines the United States, Europe and the
Caribbean. This has several other advantages as well over the approach taken so
far. The United States and the European Union combined have a GDP that is
49% of world GDP in 2010, which better re￿ ects the two equally sized countries in
our model. In addition, several European countries have had their own mortgage
market problems independent of the United States.
Based on the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, of the foreign assets held by
European banks outside of Europe, 52% is held in the U.S. and the Caribbean. Sim-
ilarly, 58% of foreign assets held by U.S. banks are in Europe and the Caribbean.
Assuming, as before, that 85% of U.S. banking assets are domestic, and similarly
for Europe, and that about 55%of their foreign assets are within the U.S./Europe/Caribbean,
this implies that about 93% of assets of banks within the expanded Home country
are claims on the expanded Home country itself.
Setting ￿ = 0:93, Figure 3 implies that, independent of the type of borrowing
constraints, transmission to the Foreign country is just short of 25%.12 The impact
on the Foreign country is therefore at most one fourth of the impact on the Home
country. This is even more at odds with the data, which shows that the world
outside of the U.S. and Europe was similarly impacted overall (in terms of GDP
12It is 20% without borrowing constraints, 24% with a constant leverage constraint and 23%
with margin constraints.
28and stock prices).
4.5 Discussion and Connection to the 2008 Crisis
The model clearly has a hard time accounting for the global nature of the 2008-
2009 crisis, both in terms of transmission and the magnitude of the impact. It is
quite possible that there are other important transmission mechanisms that are not
captured by our simple model. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming, which this paper
shares with the related recent literature reviewed in the next section, is that we
have not allowed for the possibility of default of leveraged institutions. Introducing
the possibility of default by itself would not change the results much when we only
consider collateralized borrowing, which leads to the margin constraints. This
is because lenders can then minimize the probability of any loss by demanding
su¢ cient collateral.
However, this abstracts from unsecured lending, for example in the form of
interbank lending. In that case default by a leveraged institution leads to losses by
the lender, which may possibly be a leveraged institution itself. In that case it is
possible to get a domino e⁄ect, where one bankruptcy leads to other bankruptcies
of leveraged institutions. This is the case in the bank run model of Allen and Gale
(2000).
In addition, a lemons problem can arise as well in this case when lenders do
not know what is on the balance sheet of leveraged institutions. Consider for
example a leveraged institution that does not have any exposure to risky asset
backed securities, sometimes referred to as ￿toxic assets￿ . With collateralized
borrowing this institution should have no problem as it only has good collateral
to o⁄er. However, the story is di⁄erent with unsecured lending. The lender then
needs to make a judgment about the balance sheet overall. Even if the borrowing
institution has no toxic assets, the lender does not know this. This may cause such
unsecured lending to freeze up, consistent with the drying up of interbank lending
and the commercial paper market during the crisis.
It remains to be seen how much such additional transmission channels can
account for the impact of the crisis outside of the United States and Europe. Sev-
eral separate pieces of information though give us pause in interpreting the global
nature of the crisis as resulting from transmission through leveraged institutions.
First, evidence reported by Kamin and Pounder Demarco (2010) and Rose and
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tries have with the United States (including exposure to U.S. mortgage backed
securities) and the decline in their asset prices and GDP growth. Indeed, it is
particularly puzzling that Japan and emerging markets, which have had very lim-
ited exposure to U.S. ABS, were as much a⁄ected as the United States. In fact,
Japanese GDP growth dropped even more than in the United States.
Second, Kahle and Stulz (2010) provide evidence suggesting that a global credit
shock alone is at odds with the facts. Less credit would have implied that non-
￿nancial ￿rms issue more equity and reduce cash holdings, the exact opposite of
what we saw in the data. It would also imply that investment drops more for
￿rms that are more bank dependent, which is not what we see in the data. They
conclude that the global nature of the crisis is more easily explained by a negative
demand shock or (possibly related) a risk shock.
Third, Hebling, Huiddrom, Kose and Otrok (2010) take a more econometric
approach to evaluate the role of a global credit shock in accounting for the global
recession. Using VAR analysis they ￿nd that a global credit contraction during the
crisis had virtually no e⁄ect on global GDP in 2008 and even in 2009 can account
for at most one tenth of the decline in global GDP. Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
(2008) show that there was not a decline in bank credit in the U.S. at all in 2008
and that both consumer loans and commercial and industrial loans actually rose
at the end of 2008. Some have pointed out that this was the result of drawing on
existing credit lines while new loans went down. But still it is hard to see how a
recession of this magnitude could happen as a result of a credit shock without any
actual decline in bank lending.
A ￿nal piece of evidence that appears hard to explain with a bank transmission
channel alon is the spike in risk seen in the data. Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2010) show that the VIX (measure of stock price risk) approximately quadrupled
across all industrialized countries, and even in emerging markets.
It is possible to have an endogenous increase in asset price risk in a more
dynamic version of the model where asset returns depend on asset prices changes.
The contraction of leveraged institutions implies a drop in liquidity as they are
more sensitive to asset price changes than non-leveraged investors. This in turn
can increase asset price volatility in response to future shocks, thus increasing risk
today. This link between balance sheets, liquidity and risk has received a lot of
attention in recent contributions such as Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier
30and Pedersen (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011), Gromb and Vayanos
(2008), He and Krishnamurthy (2008a, b).13 But none have been able to generate
the huge spike in risk seen in the data.
Even if you could successfully generate a huge spike in risk this way, it is not
clear how this could generate an equal spike in risk in other countries. This is
particularly a concern as it is hard to separate the sharp drop in asset prices from
the spike in risk. In order to explain the global nature of the crisis in terms of
asset prices we therefore need to understand the global nature of the spike in risk.
An explanation that is quite di⁄erent from transmission through leveraged
institutions is o⁄ered in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010). They develop a
model where there is a common self-ful￿lling spike in risk in both the Home and
Foreign country that is very large in magnitude and accompanied by a very sharp
drop in asset prices. All that is needed is an event somewhere in the world that
becomes a trigger for such a global risk panic and coordinates perceptions of risk
around a particularly weak macro fundamental. The events in the Fall of 2008 in
the United States had plenty to o⁄er in that regard. Later on, in May of 2010 the
VIX again tripled as Greek debt became a new fear factor in the market.
A related weakness of the model is that it cannot account for the sharp drop
in leverage during the Fall of 2008, especially among brokers and dealers. In
the absence of borrowing constraints, as well as with margin constraints, leverage
increases as the lower asset prices raise the expected excess return, which increase
optimal leverage. This is related to the constant asset return risk in the model.
An increase in risk would reduce optimal leverage.
5 Connection to Existing Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several related papers that have inves-
tigated the role of leveraged ￿nancial institutions in the international transmission
of balance sheet shocks. We now discuss how the ￿ndings in these papers relate to
the one in this paper.
An early contribution, in a middle of the crisis itself, came from Krugman
(2008). With only a very sketchy model he shows how a drop in the Home asset
price leads to a drop in the Foreign asset price through the balance sheets of lever-
13See also Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001).
31aged institutions. This happens both because the Foreign leveraged institutions
have exposure to Home assets (the balance sheet valuation channel) and because
the lower net worth of Home leveraged institutions reduces their demand for For-
eign assets. Regarding this portfolio growth or lending channel, Krugman credits
Calvo (1998) for originally proposing this transmission channel in the context of
contagion from Brazil to Russia in 1998 through the balance sheets of hedge funds.
Devereux and Sutherland (2010), building on Devereux and Yetman (2010), de-
velop a two-country general equilibrium model with leveraged institutions. There
are investors, who are similar to our leveraged ￿nancial institutions, who borrow
from savers to invest in risky assets and face a constant leverage constraint. The
model di⁄ers from ours in that there are no non-leveraged investors that make
portfolio decisions. There are savers that can buy both bonds and capital, but
they are not portfolio investors as in our model. They use the capital for ￿back-
yard￿production, which leads to a demand for capital where a ￿rst-order rise in
the price leads to a ￿rst-order drop in demand.14 The shocks that they consider
tighten the borrowing constraint of the leveraged investors. While these are dif-
ferent from our wealth shocks due to mortgage losses, they have the same e⁄ect of
leading to a ￿rst-order drop in demand for risky assets.
In their setup the shocks have a ￿rst-order impact on asset prices. This con-
trasts with the result that asset price changes are generally third-order in our
model, even with a constant leverage constraint. The much larger impact is due
to the absence of any regular non-leveraged portfolio investors in the model. This
is exactly what we ￿nd in this paper as well when we let the share of risky assets
held by non-leveraged institutions become very small, although we have found this
case to be highly unrealistic.
Regarding transmission, Devereux and Sutherland (2010) only consider the
case where ￿nancial markets are perfectly integrated (no frictions associated with
investing in foreign equity) and there is ￿nancial autarky (only bonds are traded,
equity is not traded). Consistent with our results they ￿nd that transmission
is perfect (Home and Foreign equity prices are equally a⁄ected) under perfect
￿nancial integration. In the absence of international trade in risky assets, the
Home and Foreign asset prices actually move in opposite directions. This is similar
in spirit to our ￿nding that there is no positive transmission when ￿ = 1. In their
14By contrast, for regular portfolio investors a third-order rise in the price leads to a ￿rst-order
drop in demand.
32model the Foreign asset price actually rises instead of remaining unchanged as in
our model. The reason for this is a fall in the equilibrium world interest rate in
their model, which we kept constant.
Devereux and Sutherland (2010) do not consider the intermediate cases of par-
tial ￿nancial integration. A reasonable conjecture though is that even under partial
￿nancial integration their model implies full transmission. This is due to the ab-
sence of non-leveraged portfolio investors, which leads to the ￿rst-order changes
in asset prices. This relates to the discussion at the end of Section 3.3.. While
leveraged investors are unable to arbitrage between stocks and bonds, they are able
to arbitrage between Home and Foreign stocks. Even if we introduce a ￿nancial
friction that leads to large home bias, it is still the case that to the ￿rst-order ex-
pected returns on Home and Foreign stock are equalized. As there are no dividend
shocks, this implies that changes in Home and Foreign asset prices move perfectly
together to the ￿rst-order.
In the context of a somewhat di⁄erent model, this last point has also been em-
phasized by Dedola and Lombardo (2010). In their model the leveraged investors
do not face a leverage constraint, but instead face a Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist
type of ￿nancial friction that leads to an external ￿nance premium that depends
on net worth. They ￿nd that a ￿rst-order shock to the external ￿nance premium
has a ￿rst-order impact on asset prices that is the same across the two countries
(perfect transmission). They emphasize that this does not depend on the extent
of international portfolio diversi￿cation.
While the model is a bit di⁄erent, these results are again due to the absence
of non-leveraged portfolio investors. In their model they exogenously shock the
borrowing rate of leveraged investors to the ￿rst-order. In models with a leverage
constraint, the constraint has the e⁄ect of generating a ￿rst-order increase in the
e⁄ective borrowing rate due to either a tightening of the constraint or a drop in
wealth. The end result is the same though. It is fundamentally the result of the
absence of any arbitrage between stocks and bonds (due to the absence of non-
leveraged investors) while there is arbitrage between Home and Foreign stocks.
The former justi￿es a ￿rst-order rise in the premium (expected excess return of
stocks over bonds), and therefore ￿rst-order drop in stock prices, while the latter
implies that Home and Foreign asset prices will change the same to the ￿rst-order.
In these previous two papers the leveraged investors hold risky equity of both
countries. There are also a number of papers that have considered the role of lever-
33aged ￿nancial institutions in transmitting Home ￿nancial shocks to the Foreign
country through credit channels. This is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from transmis-
sion through asset prices as a drop in lending usually entails a rise in lending rates,
which is analogous to the drop in the price of assets. Kollmann et.al. (2010) de-
velops a model with a banking sector that is perfectly integrated across countries.
There is one global bank. In that case a negative balance sheet shock to the bank
leads to an equal drop in lending to entrepreneurs of both countries (which takes
place through a higher landing rate) and Home and Foreign output drop equally.
Transmission is again perfect because of the assumption that ￿nancial markets are
perfectly integrated across countries. Perri and Quadrini (2011) also have a model
where a decline in credit leads to the same impact on two countries when ￿nancial
markets are perfectly integrated.
Ueda (2010) and Kalemli-Ozcan et.al. (2011) consider models that allow for
partial international integration. Ueda (2010) has a quite complicated model in
which ￿nancial intermediaries and entrepreneurs all face borrowing constraints,
there are 4 parameters that measure di⁄erent aspects of ￿nancial integration across
the two countries and 4 di⁄erent types of shocks. The paper compares ￿nancial
autarky to partial ￿nancial integration and ￿nds partial transmission under a shock
to the balance sheet of the Home ￿nancial intermediaries. This is consistent with
our ￿ndings, but there is no attempt to assess the extent of transmission under
calibrated values of the various ￿nancial integration parameters.
Kalemli-Ozcan et.al. (2011) consider a model where the extent of cross-country
banking integration is measured by a parameter ￿. There are two sectors. In sector
1 banks intermediate between consumers and ￿rms in the domestic country only,
while in sector 2 banks operate at a global level without any friction. The relative
size of sector 2 is ￿, which can be seen as a measure of banking integration. The
paper focuses on business cycle synchronization under a combination of technology
shocks and bank balance sheet shocks. It ￿nds that bank balance sheet shocks
contribute to higher business cycle synchronization. But the paper does not report
the extent of transmission of balance sheet shocks as a function of ￿.
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We have developed a very simple two-country model with leveraged ￿nancial insti-
tutions in order to consider various channels through which a balance sheet shock
to leveraged institutions in one-country can a⁄ect the other country. We have
identi￿ed ￿ve transmission channels: a direct exposure channel, a balance sheet
valuation channel, a portfolio growth or lending channel, a balance sheet constraint
channel and an arbitrage channel.
Even though there are quite a few transmission channels, we have seen that
both transmission and the magnitude of the impact on asset prices are well be-
low those in the data. The small share of risky assets that is held by leveraged
￿nancial institutions signi￿cantly limits both the magnitude of the impact and
the transmission. In addition, the large home bias in assets of leveraged ￿nancial
institutions, especially when the Home country combines the United States and
Europe, signi￿cantly limits transmission.
Future research most productively can go in two directions. First, one could
consider additional transmission channels. As discussed in Section 4, a substantial
limitation of our model (shared with the related literature) is that we do not
consider unsecured lending in the context of the possibility of default of leveraged
institutions. Doing so may generate additional transmission channels. This is
especially the case when lenders have imperfect information about the assets on
the balance sheet of the borrower.
Second, we need to consider other types of explanations for the global nature
of the crisis. An example is the risk panic explanation discussed at the end of
Section 4. A good model should connect to a variety of key stylized facts, such as
the absence of a decline in bank credit, a common large spike in risk all around the
world and the absence of a relationship between ￿nancial linkages and transmission.
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In this Appendix we derive the theoretical results from Section 3 under the
three di⁄erent assumptions about borrowing constraints.
No Borrowing Constraints
Di⁄erentiating (8)-(9) around QH = QF = 1 gives
￿(1 + R)(2 ￿ ￿)(W + ￿ W)dQH + PREM(dWH + (1 ￿ ￿)dWF) = 0 (64)
￿(1 + R)(2 ￿ ￿)(W + ￿ W)dQF + PREM((1 ￿ ￿)dWH + dWF) = 0 (65)
where we have used that PREM = D ￿ (1 + R) is the excess return. It is useful
to rewrite this in terms of sums and di⁄erences, giving
￿(1 + R)(W + ￿ W)(dQH + dQF) + PREM(dWH + dWF) = 0 (66)
￿(1 + R)(2 ￿ ￿)(W + ￿ W)(dQH ￿ dQF) + PREM￿(dWH ￿ dWF) = 0 (67)
Using LEV = (W0 + B0 ￿ L0)=W0, we have
dWH = (1 + R)W0LEV (￿dQH + (1 ￿ ￿)dQF) ￿ (1 + R)W0￿LOSS (68)
dWF = (1 + R)W0LEV ((1 ￿ ￿)dQH + ￿dQF) ￿ (1 + R)W0(1 ￿ ￿)LOSS (69)
where LOSS = L0d￿=W0. (66) and (67) then become
￿
￿(W + ￿ W) + PREM ￿ LEV ￿ W0
￿
(dQH + dQF)
￿PREM ￿ W0 ￿ LOSS = 0 (70)
￿
￿(2 ￿ ￿)(W + ￿ W) + PREM ￿ LEV ￿ W0 ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿
(dQH ￿ dQF)
￿(2￿ ￿ 1)￿ ￿ PREM ￿ W0 ￿ LOSS = 0 (71)
Dividing (70) by (W + ￿ W)=(1+R) and (71) by (W + ￿ W)(2￿￿)=(1+R), and
using 2￿ ￿ 1 = ￿=(2 ￿ ￿), this implies
dQH + dQF = ￿
1
d1
PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS (72)







PREM ￿ SHARE ￿ LOSS (73)
where d1 and d2 are de￿ned in (34)-(35). Taking the sum and di⁄erence of these
equations gives the expressions for dQH and dQF in (32)-(33).
36Constant Leverage Constraints
Di⁄erentiating (16)-(17) around QH = QF = 1 and RH = RF = R gives the
same expressions as (64) and (65) with respectively the terms ￿W(dRH + (1 ￿
￿)dRF) and ￿W((1 ￿ ￿)dRH + dRF) added on the left hand side. (72)-(73) then
become
dQH + dQF = ￿
1
d1




SHARE ￿ (dRH + dRF) (74)













SHARE ￿ (dRH ￿ dRF) (75)
Di⁄erentiating (14)-(15) gives
dRH = ￿
1 + R ￿ PREM
2 ￿ ￿
(dQH + (1 ￿ ￿)dQF) (76)
dRF = ￿
1 + R ￿ PREM
2 ￿ ￿
((1 ￿ ￿)dQH + dQF) (77)
Using these expressions in (74)-(75), we have
dQH + dQF =
1
e1
( ￿ dQH + ￿ dQF) (78)
dQH ￿ dQF =
1
e2
( ￿ dQH + ￿ dQF) (79)
where ￿ dQH and ￿ dQF are the asset prices changes in the absence of balance sheet
constraints and e1 and e2 are de￿ned in (49)-(50). Taking the sum and di⁄erence
of these equations then gives (46)-(47).
Margin Constraints
Di⁄erentiating (27)-(28) around QH = QF = 1 and ￿H = ￿F = ￿ gives the
same expressions as (64) and (65) with respectively the terms ￿PREM￿W(d￿H+
(1 ￿ ￿)d￿F)=￿ and ￿PREM ￿ W((1 ￿ ￿)d￿H + d￿F)=￿ added on the left hand
37side. (72)-(73) then become
dQH + dQF = ￿
1
d1















































((1 ￿ ￿)dQH + dQF) (83)














PREM ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)





PREM ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)
(1 + R ￿ LEV ￿ PREM)((1 ￿ ￿)dQH + dQF)(86)
Substituting these results into (80)-(81) gives
dQH + dQF =
1
h1
( ￿ dQH + ￿ dQF) (87)
dQH ￿ dQF =
1
h2
( ￿ dQH + ￿ dQF) (88)
where ￿ dQH and ￿ dQF are the asset prices changes in the absence of balance sheet
constraints and h1 and h2 are de￿ned in (57)-(58). Taking the sum and di⁄erence
of these equations then gives (54)-(55).
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